




La Publicación de Trayectorias: un Estudio sobre la Protección de la Privacidad

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
October 20, 2022

Motivation


“Privacy is one the biggest problems in this new electronic age”- Andy Grove (former INTEL Ceo)



Statistical Disclosure Control



Statistical Disclosure Control



Trajectories

Raw Trajectories



$$T = (x_1, y_1, t_1) \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow (x_n, y_n, t_n)$$

Semantic Trajectories



POI

Properties



Easy re-identification

Diversity & Uniqueness

Sensitivity

$$\Delta(f) := \max_{\|D, D'\|_1=1} \|f(D) - f(D')\|_1$$

$$D = \begin{cases} T_1 : & p_1^{(1)} & p_2^{(1)} & \dots & p_{m_1}^{(1)} \\ T_2 : & p_1^{(2)} & p_2^{(2)} & \dots & p_{m_2}^{(2)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ T_r : & p_1^{(r)} & p_2^{(r)} & \dots & p_{m_r}^{(r)} \end{cases},$$

Correlation



Streaming context




High dimensional

Scalability problems

Privacy Notions in SDC

Syntactic Notions


Database properties




- k -anonymity
- l -diversity
- t -closeness
- Attribute Privacy

Semantic Notions

ϵ -differential privacy




Differential Privacy




ϵ -Differential Privacy

A randomized algorithm M is said to be ϵ -differentially private if for all neighboring databases D, D' and all $S \subseteq \text{Range}(M)$,

$$\mathbb{P}\{M(D) \in S\} \leq e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}\{M(D') \in S\}.$$




Differential Privacy



Privacy Loss (by observing r)

$$\mathcal{L}_{M(D)||M(D')}^r = \ln \left(\frac{\mathbb{P}(M(D) = r)}{\mathbb{P}(M(D') = r)} \right)$$



Sensitivity

ℓ_1 -sensitivity

The ℓ_1 -sensitivity of a function $f: \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ is:

$$\Delta(f) := \max_{\|D, D'\|_1=1} \|f(D) - f(D')\|_1$$

UNBOUNDED SENSITIVITIES!!

outliers and huge noise

S-O-T-A analysis

Privacy Notion	Classification	Ref.	Correct DP notion	Laplace	Exponential	Considers time			Total data preserv.	SM: Euclidean				SM: Hausdorff				SM: Other	Other	Loc. visit counts		Freq. seq.	Spatial density		Other	Realism assurance			
				Mech.	Properties			Close data preserv.				Statistics preserv.																	
ϵ -DP*		[107]		•	◦	✗	✓	✗	•	◦	◦	◦	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		
ϵ -DP	Noisy counts	Exploration tree	[15, 16]	•	◦	✗	✗	✗	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	•	•	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦		
			[30]	•	◦	✗	✗	✗	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	•	•	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	
			[123]	✗	•	◦	✗	✗	✗	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	•	◦	◦	◦	
	Sequence tree	[121]	✗	•	◦	✗	✗	✗	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	
		[117]	✗	•	◦	✗	✗	✗	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	•	◦	◦	◦	
		[120]	✗	•	◦	✗	✓	✓	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	•	◦	◦	◦	◦	
	Clustering	Trajectory count	Tree + Markov	[10]	✗	•	◦	✗	✓	✗	◦	•	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	•	•	◦	◦	◦
				Random centroid	[19, 57]	✗	•	•	✗	✓	✗	◦	◦	•	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦
		k -means	[70]	✗	•	•	✗	✓	✗	◦	◦	•	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦
			Hilbert curves	[54]	✗	•	•	✗	✓	✗	◦	◦	•	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	•	◦	◦
Universal clustering			[122]	✗	•	◦	✗	✓	✗	◦	•	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	
$(0, \delta)$ -DP	Sampling + interpolation	[91]		◦	◦	✗	✓	✗	◦	•	◦	•	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦	◦		
ϵ -LDP	Perturbation	[24]		◦	•	✓	✓	✓	◦	◦	◦	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		

Privacy Limitations

Inherent properties of trajectory data

Correlation
leads to
filtering attacks
&
physical models
attacks
&
fake trajectory
detection

Problems of current proposals


streaming context

Bayesian
inference

not all dimensions
are
protected

semantics
attribute
disclosure

Wrong proofs
& sensitivities



Utility limitations

Inherent properties of trajectory data

Sparseness

leads to
Unavoidable
data lost
&
high sensitivities

High
dimensionality

Problems of current proposals

Impossible trajectories

Small universe of locations

Utility metrics are not representative

Weird trajectory patterns

Ignoring the temporal dimension



Conclusions and Future Research

