

Authenticated Encryption for Janus-Based Acoustic Underwater Communication

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Introduction

- Wireless underwater communication networks are rapidly increasing in quantity
- Janus – the most established physical-layer, acoustic standard
 - No security mechanisms
 - Confidentiality and integrity of data must be ensured
- Attacks are similar as in radio-based communication
 - Three main categories
 - Eavesdropping
 - Routing attacks
 - Data tampering
 - Authenticated encryption counteracts these
- Main challenges for providing security features:
 - Low data rate
 - High packet loss compared to air interfaces


Janus Properties

- 80 bps, 10 km range
- 64-bit baseline packet
 - 34-bit Application Data Block (ADB)
 - Up to 10 min. additional cargo reservation (48 kb)
- Several baseline packets → less efficiency
- Cargo → channel reservation


Version number	Mobility flag	Schedule flag	Tx/Rx	Forward capability	Class user i.d.	Application type	Repeat	Reservation time	Application data block	CRC	Optional cargo
4	1	1	1	1	8	6	1	7	26	8	$n \leq 48000$

First Authentication Protocol

- Authentication based on timestamps
 - TS, CD, F are exchanged
- Encryption with $RC5 - 32/12/16$
 - Pre-shared long-term key K_n
- Timestamps are checked for validity and used for ranging
- Session key K_{AB} is derived from $MMSI_A, TS_A, CD_A$ and $MMSI_B, TS_B, CD_B$
 - Each new K_{AB} is unique due to timestamp
- K_{AB} is stored in a lookup table of all other K_n s and MMSIs



Proposal 1: CCM




$$B_0 = \text{Flags}_1 || N || Q$$

$$ctr_1 = \text{Flags}_2 || N || i$$


- Input:
 - Nonce N (32 b, expanded to 64 b upon reception)
 - Associated data AD (24 b without cargo, 32 b with cargo)
 - Consists of Janus header and F
 - Payload P (92 b)
 - Consists of TS , CD , and MMSIs of sender and receiver
- Output:
 - MAC tag T (32 b)
 - $C = AES(P || T, K)$
- (N, AD, C) are transmitted with Janus
- Relies on formatting and counter generation functions

CCM in the Authentication Protocol

Without Cargo



With Cargo




Proposal 2: AEGIS-256


- State update
 - 6 AES rounds
 - Runs for every 16-byte plaintext block
- Initialization
 - K and IV are loaded into the state
- Processing of AD
 - AD is used to update the state
- Encryption
 - Plaintext blocks are XORed with state blocks
- Finalization
 - T is constructed from the state
- Input:
 - K (256 b)
 - IV (32 b, expanded to 256 b upon reception)
 - AD (24 b without cargo, 32 b with cargo)
 - P (92 b)
- (IV, AD, C, T) are transmitted with Janus

AEGIS in the Authentication Protocol


Without Cargo





With Cargo





Simulation Results: Original Protocol



Simulation Results: CCM



Simulation Results: AEGIS-256



Conclusion

- Contributions
 - Proposed two AE schemes for providing confidentiality and integrity in wireless acoustic underwater communication using the Janus standard
 - Evolved the original protocol and kept the ranging functionality
 - Minimized communication overhead for completion within a reasonable time period in a simulation environment
 - Results indicate the possibility of practical realization
 - Provided high security against most attacks
- Future work:
 - Authenticated key exchange with forward secrecy to justify K_{AB}
 - Real-world implementation and testing